Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information
研究了股东信息在收购广泛持股公司中的作用：信息精度增加会加剧搭便车问题，但信息分散时提供更优信息能提高收购价和股东价值。
We study the role of shareholder information during the acquisition of widely held firms. When target shareholders share the same information about the post-takeover value, increasing the precision of information has no effect on the expected acquisition price. However, more precise information aggravates the free-rider problem, allowing shareholders to better discern when it is worthwhile to hold out rather than tender their shares. By contrast, when information is dispersed among shareholders, providing shareholders with superior information induces the raider to offer higher prices, thus increasing shareholder value. However, in this case, neither prices nor tendering decisions aggregate any information.