Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
研究了代理人能私下观察自己行动随机结果时的道德风险问题，委托人面临事后逆向选择，最优契约无法在所有状态下实现真实披露，审计与转移支付成为战略互补。
I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit and transfer become strategic complements; this is rooted in the nonseparability of the problem.