Lending Booms and Lending Standards
研究银行如何利用私有信息调整贷款标准，导致贷款扩张、资产质量下降和金融不稳定，解释了新兴市场金融自由化后贷款繁荣与银行危机的连锁反应。
ABSTRACT We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.