Optimal agenda‐setter timing
分析了议程设定者何时提议项目投票的最优时机问题，考虑共同和个体收益成分，以及议程设定者相对于中位委员的偏好偏差，发现正负偏差的设定者都能实施不同于中位委员偏好的决策。
Abstract We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.