Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts
分析了企业通过排他性合同和市场份额折扣竞争的效果：排他性合同加剧竞争、降低价格并提升福利，而市场份额折扣导致双重加价、提高价格并损害买方利益，对竞争政策有启示。
We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers' informational rents. However, exclusive contracts intensify competition, thus reducing prices and profits and (in all Pareto undominated equilibria) increasing welfare. Market-share discounts, by contrast, produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy.