Criminal Deterrence when There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety
研究通过选民公投终止交通摄像头监控项目，利用12年地理编码警察事故数据，发现摄像头改变了事故类型，但未减少总事故或伤害数量。
Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries.