CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING
研究发现董事会独立性越高，银行贷款的利率、抵押品、契约等条款越优惠，银团贷款参与银行更多；审计委员会独立性也影响非价格条款。
Abstract We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance‐pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.