Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices–a Theory of Preemptive Mergers
解释了一个实证谜题：并购为何降低利润却提高股价。如果成为“内部人”优于“外部人”，企业可能先发制人并购以防止对手抢先。模型预测了并购发生的条件、时机及盈余分配。
'We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value of the insiders is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also explain why shareholders of targets gain while acquirers typically break even. These results are derived in an endogenousmerger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared.' (author's abstract)