Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
研究了银行CEO在危机前的激励结构是否与危机期间的银行表现相关，发现与股东利益更一致的CEO反而导致更差表现，且CEO未提前减持股票，遭受巨大财富损失。
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.