Optimal Equity Stakes and Corporate Control
证明企业可能为了未来的公司控制活动而最优地出售自身股权给其他企业，模型显示股权能实现最优机制，帮助合作方从后续外部竞标者中提取剩余，且持股比例受外部竞标者调查意愿的限制。
I show that firms may optimally sell blocks of their own equity to other firms in anticipation of future corporate control activity. In the model, a target and one potential acquirer, who may also be an alliance partner, can negotiate before synergy values are learned. I find that equity implements an optimal mechanism, allowing the partners to extract surplus from outside bidders who may arrive later. The stake is limited by the outsiders' willingness to investigate. The results imply that corporate control may motivate an equity sale even when no takeover activity is apparent at the time or occurs ex post.