OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION
研究了公共采购中成本超支现象，认为这是最优招标程序的结果：采购方通过仅考虑价格的拍卖授予合同，且无法承诺不重新谈判，导致最终价格超过初始价格。
Abstract Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price‐only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for a fancy than a standard design, it is optimal to fix the standard design ex ante. If renegotiation takes place and the fancy design has higher production costs or the contractor's bargaining position is strong, the final price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a scoring auction.