A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
构建了一个有限动态博弈模型，其中玩家可随意改变主意但需支付转换成本，从而内生地产生承诺能力。研究发现两人两行动博弈存在唯一子博弈完美均衡，且该均衡不受行动顺序影响。
Commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action. The weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed, as it is assumed. This paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model. We construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish, but pay a switching cost if they do so. We show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium with a simple structure. This equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications. Moreover, despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches, strategic delays may arise in equilibrium. The flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments. In particular, we study an entry deterrence situation. Its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.