Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling
整合了企业向消费者传递产品质量的两种方式：直接披露和信号传递，并分析企业如何选择沟通渠道，以及这种选择对披露、信号传递、企业偏好和社会效率的影响。
Firms communicate product quality to consumers through a variety of channels. Economic models of such communication take two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: (i) disclosure of quality through a credible direct claim; or (ii) signalling of quality via producer actions that influence buyers' beliefs about quality. In general, these two literatures have ignored one another. We argue that firms should be viewed as choosing which means of communication they will employ. We show that integration of these two alternatives leads to new implications about disclosure, signalling, firm preferences over type, and the social efficiency of the channel of communication employed.