Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture
提出一个关于国际主权债务期限的理论，分析其如何影响债务国政策，并评估国际最后贷款人、暂停偿债机制等改革措施的福利效果，对研究国际金融体系改革的学者有参考价值。
This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt, and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. The analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries, but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as international lending-in-last-resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries.