Antitrust holdup source, cross‐national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
研究国内并购中反垄断阻碍的来源（本国或外国），发现行业全球竞争力是主要驱动因素，并结合制度条件提出更精确的预测，为管理者制定政治策略提供指导。
Abstract Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home nation or foreign nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source. Further, I factor institutional conditions to yield more precise predictions tailored to the cross‐national environment for antitrust policy. Exploratory empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992–2000 period provide support for baseline predictions. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.