PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING
研究了消费者和企业内生决定单归属、多归属或退出市场的双边市场，发现竞争瓶颈均衡总是存在，且多归属与低价相关，内生归属可能引发跨平台定价以阻止价格战。
Abstract We consider two‐sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single‐home, multi‐home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single‐home and firms multi‐home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi‐homing and single‐homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi‐homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi‐homing: agents find multi‐homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.