ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*
研究单次匹配模型中工资报价的信号传递和筛选作用，发现工资模式取决于工人和企业的质量分布，能解释多种工资现象。
This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.