Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises
证明，在固定汇率制度下，投机攻击有时是理性的，因为资产价格路径必须消除异常利润机会；但在某些政策预期下，国际收支危机也可能纯粹是自我实现的事件，即使制度永久可行也可能崩溃，经济存在多重均衡。
Speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset-price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities. Suchattacks are fully rational, as they reflect the market's response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable. The authors shows that under someexpectations about policy, balance-of-payments crises can also be purely self-fulfilling events. In such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse, and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis. The behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.