CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS: ESTIMATES FROM A BARGAINING MODEL*
利用破产谈判中达成的分配信息，通过博弈论模型估算企业未观测到的清算价值，发现行业条件越好、实际利率越高时清算价值越高，并模拟了强制清算的影响。
This article uses a novel approach to measure the unobserved liquidation value of a firm that relies on the information contained in the allocations that are agreed upon in Chapter 11 negotiations. I estimate a game theoretic model that captures the influence of liquidation value on the equilibrium allocations using a newly collected data set. I find that the liquidation values are higher when the industry conditions are more favorable, and the real interest rates are higher. I use the estimated model to conduct a counterfactual experiment to quantitatively assess the impact of a mandatory liquidation on the equilibrium allocations.