Distracted Shareholders and Corporate Actions
研究发现，当机构股东因其他投资组合的冲击而分心时，公司更可能进行破坏价值的多元化收购、授予CEO择时期权、削减股息，且CEO因业绩差被解雇的可能性降低，同时公司股票回报异常低。
Investor attention matters for corporate actions. Our new identification approach constructs firm-level shareholder "distraction" measures, by exploiting exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of institutional shareholders' portfolios. Firms with "distracted" shareholders are more likely to announce diversifying, value-destroying, acquisitions. They are also more likely to grant opportunistically-timed CEO stock options, more likely to cut dividends, and less likely to fire their CEO for bad performance. Firms with distracted shareholders have abnormally low stock returns. Combined, these patterns are consistent with a model in which the unrelated shock shifts investor attention, leading to a temporary loosening of monitoring constraints.