Strategic policy for product R&D with symmetric costs
研究国际双寡头市场中，政府如何通过补贴政策影响企业产品研发和质量选择，发现单边政策可使本国企业生产高质量产品，而双边政策下两国补贴方案不同但机会均等。
Abstract. In this paper I examine strategic policy for product R&D in an international duopoly where domestic and foreign firms are identical. It is shown that strategic R&D policy is described by a subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices. Unilateral policy enables its domestic firm to produce a high‐quality product, making equilibrium outcome unique. With two active governments, in equilibrium they implement different subsidy schedules. Two equilibrium outcomes exist, which are identical except for the identity of the countries. Thus, both countries have an equal chance to become the high‐quality exporter. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are examined.