THE ROLE OF FEES IN PATENT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
综述了专利费用对申请人行为的影响及最优费用设定的经济学文献，并提供了全球30个专利局费用的新事实，适合研究专利制度的经济学者和政策制定者参考。
Abstract This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre‐grant) fees and renewal (or post‐grant) fees, depending on the structural context and policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of 30 patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age.