Innovation Incentives under Transferable Fast‐Track Regulatory Review
研究2007年美国法律下可转让快速审评券如何影响人道主义药物和其他产品的创新，并分析其带来的跨领域竞争效应。
Under a 2007 U.S. law, the developer of a treatment for a neglected disease is rewarded with a fast‐track voucher that can be sold to another developer. Similar fast‐track vouchers are being offered by other agencies. We model how the existence of transferable, fast‐track vouchers can impact innovation for both humanitarian and other products, and can create competition between otherwise unrelated pursuits. We consider the tradability of fast‐track vouchers and map these to innovation race outcomes. Our analysis highlights areas for further exploration in policy settings as well as predictions for empirical analysis.