Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
证明在信息不对称下，监督者与被监督者可能合谋，此时软信息监督仍有价值，并推导出集中与分散两种组织形式的等价性原理，为监督结构效率提供比较静态分析。
This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the efficiency of supervisory structures. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.