Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others
研究了多贷款人贷款比单贷款人贷款更常被重组还是更少，以及多贷款人是否对新信息做出有效反应，强调信息精度的作用，发现均衡可能过度清算或过度重组。
Are multiple‐lender loans rescheduled more or less often than single‐lender loans? Do multiple lenders react efficiently to new information? Our analysis emphasizes the role of the precision of information: lenders trade off benefits from immediate foreclosure against expected benefits of waiting for other lenders to act, given the likelihood that other lenders’ information is more precise. We analyse a Bayesian game where signals distributed to lenders may differ in precision and content. Equilibria display excessive liquidation or excessive rescheduling, depending on the likelihood of information. Outcomes are nevertheless second‐best, given the constraint that private information cannot be merged.