DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY?*
研究发现，针对高价值用户的版权执法会导致版权方收取超高垄断价格，反而促使低价值用户转向盗版；但扩大执法覆盖范围可降低价格、增加正版销量并提升消费者剩余。
When copyright enforcement is targeted at high‐value buyers such as corporate and government users, the copyright holder charges super‐monopoly prices, thereby encouraging low‐value buyers to switch to inferior pirated copies. We show that enlarging the copyright holder's captive market through more extensive copyright enforcement reduces prices toward the monopoly level, increases sales of legitimate copies and can increase consumer surplus. Therefore, in contrast with the case of more intensive copyright enforcement, more extensive copyright enforcement over some range can increase the incentive to generate intellectual property while also reducing the loss to consumers from monopoly power.