Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia
提出公司战略的遗产潜力是CEO薪酬、更替和战略变革的重要决定因素，解释了为何CEO更替常伴随战略变革，即使CEO无特殊技能。
ABSTRACT This paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm's strategy is an important determinant of CEO compensation, turnover, and strategy change. A legacy makes CEO replacement expensive, because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager. Boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched. Moreover, when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the CEO, because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail. Even though CEOs have no specific skills in our model, legacy issues can explain the empirical association between CEO and strategy change.