The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts
研究了借款人为何不选择指数化合同来分担风险，因为贷款人掌握指数衡量真实状态能力的私人信息，借款人可能为无效指数付费，从而选择非指数化合同。
ABSTRACT We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The lender is risk‐averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower. The borrower, however, might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state. We provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a nonindexed contract instead.