Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements
研究了国家在排放和技术投资决策中的博弈，推导出帕累托最优的子博弈完美均衡，发现绿色技术需过度投资而适应性和棕色技术投资不足，技术转移可能抑制投资但对异质性国家的合规必要。
Abstract This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theorems to be relevant. Relative to the first best, the best equilibrium requires countries to overinvest in technologies that are green, that is, strategic substitutes for polluting, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies, that is, strategic complements to polluting. Technological transfers and spillovers might discourage investments but can be necessary to motivate compliance with emissions when countries are heterogeneous.