Do Envious CEOs Cause Merger Waves?
提出理论说明，即使最初引发并购的冲击是特定于个别公司的，并购浪潮仍可能发生。分析预测早期收购比晚期收购带来更高的竞标方回报、更小的目标公司规模以及更高的管理层薪酬收益，并得到实证支持。
We develop a theory which shows that merger waves can arise even when the shocks that precipitated the initial mergers in the wave are idiosyncratic. The analysis predicts that the earlier acquisitions produce higher bidder returns, involve smaller targets, and result in higher compensation gains for the acquirer's top management team than the later acquisitions in the wave. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. The model also generates additional predictions, some of which remain to be tested. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.