Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline
利用15年城市零售汽油站级价格数据，研究行业如何通过价格领导和实验实现协调均衡转变，揭示合谋启动机制，对反垄断政策有启示。
This paper studies equilibrium selection in the retail gasoline industry. We exploit a unique dataset that contains the universe of station-level prices for an urban market for 15 years, and that encompasses a coordinated equilibrium transition mid-sample. We uncover a gradual, three-year equilibrium transition, whereby dominant firms use price leadership and price experiments to create focal points that coordinate market prices, soften price competition, and enhance retail margins. Our results inform the theory of collusion, with particular relevance to the initiation of collusion and equilibrium selection. We also highlight new insights into merger policy and collusion detection strategies.