A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
构建了一个理论模型，分析在新证券发行中，当发行人与投资银行之间存在信息不对称时，发行人为何需要投资银行的咨询和分销服务，并探讨了最优委托合同的设计。
Develops a theory for the demand for the advising and distribution services of investment banks when there is information asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and the investment bankers. The advising services of the investment banker are valuable when the banker has better information about the capital market, while the distribution services are useful when the banker is able to create demand for the issue. This analysis considers the delegation contract between the issuer and the banker in a negotiated, fixed price offering. The delegation contract exists when the issuer enlists the banker to both advise on the offering price and distribute the securities. In this case, the banker's decision as to whether the contract should be accepted is based on the banker's private information. Given these conditions, a model is presented, and an example is provided to illustrate the optimal delegation contract. Also examined are the situation in which the issuer only utilizes the distribution services of the banker and the situation in which the investment banker is not engaged at all. Results show that when the banker is better informed than the issuer, the new issues are underpriced. Further, those issuers of unseasoned securities who are less informed about the capital market than the issuers of seasoned securities are more likely to seek the advice of investment bankers. (SRD)