VERTICAL CONTRACTING WHEN COMPETITION FOR ORDERS PRECEDES PROCUREMENT*
研究了订单竞争先于投入品采购的纵向链条，发现即使上游存在垄断，下游仍会出现寡头竞争结果；纵向一体化使垄断者向下游传导市场势力，但并非通过排挤独立下游企业，而是弱化自身一体化单位的竞争行为。
This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. It is found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. Here, vertical integration is a means by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own integrated units.