Capital Structure under Costly Enforcement*
研究了当现金流是企业家私人信息且不同证券持有人的执行成本不同时，企业如何选择融资结构。模型预测混合资本结构下，债权人干预低现金流状态，股东干预高现金流状态，且战略违约、破产等会以正概率发生。
Abstract We consider financial structure and repayment behavior in a setting where cash flows are private information to the entrepreneur and the cost of enforcing repayment differs across security holders. If enforcement costs are lower for shareholders than for creditors, a mixed capital structure with debt and equity can obtain in equilibrium. Under a mixed capital structure, creditors intervene in low cash‐flow states while shareholders intervene in high cash‐flow states. Moreover, strategic defaults, costly bankruptcy, shareholder intervention, and violation of absolute priority occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Several of the predictions from our framework are consistent with evidence not readily explainable by existing theories.