Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
基于2001-2006年美国数据，发现对冲基金激进主义通过战略、运营和财务调整，在三分之二案例中取得成效，带来约7%的公告异常回报，并提升目标公司的分红、经营业绩和CEO更替率。
ABSTRACT Using a large hand‐collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two‐thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.