Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
用一个政治代理问题解释许多发展中国家财政政策顺周期的原因：选民在经济繁荣时要求更多公共品或减税以限制腐败政府租金，导致政策顺周期；实证表明腐败越严重的民主国家顺周期越明显。
Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.