Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social Norms
在委托代理框架中引入内生社会规范，分析其对货币激励效果的影响，并探讨最优组织分组及不可观测社会规范敏感性导致的逆向选择问题。
Research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers. Within an agency framework, we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent's cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action, defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent's peer group. We show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives, determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations, and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents' sensitivities to social norms are unobservable.