Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
研究如何估计存在多重均衡的不完全信息静态博弈模型，提出可用STATA等标准软件实现的估计方法，并应用于1998-2003年高科技股票推荐分析，发现策略动机是重要因素。
We study the estimation of static games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria. A static game is a generalization of a discrete choice model, such as a multinomial logit or probit, which allows the actions of a group of agents to be interdependent. While the estimator we study is quite flexible, in most cases it can be easily implemented using standard statistical packages such as STATA. We also propose an algorithm for simulating the model which finds all equilibria to the game. As an application of our estimator, we study recommendations for high technology stocks between 1998–2003. We find that strategic motives, typically ignored in the empirical literature, appear to be an important consideration in the recommendations submitted by equity analysts.