Barriers to Entry in the Airline Industry: A Multidimensional Regression-Discontinuity Analysis of AIR-21
研究美国AIR-21法案对高集中度机场竞争的影响，发现该法案使票价下降13.4%至20.2%，主要由低成本航司进入驱动，且服务质量未下降，乘客量增加，表明消费者福利改善。
We investigate the success of legislation aimed at increasing competition at highly concentrated U.S. airports, mainly by forcing these airports to increase the availability of scarce facilities. We use a multidimensional regression-discontinuity approach to exploit a sharp discontinuity in the law’s implementation and identify its effects. We find that fares decrease by 13.4% (20.2%) in markets with one (both) end point(s) covered. Approximately half of the decline is driven by the entry of low-cost carriers. We find little evidence that the fare declines were accompanied by a diminished quality of service, and passenger volumes increased, which suggests the legislation improved consumer welfare.