Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Exclusion from International Capital Markets
构建了一个主权违约的量化模型，解释政府为何从国际市场借款以及违约后为何暂时退出国际金融市场。模型指出，银行部门摩擦导致国内资本回报率高于世界利率，从而激励政府国际借贷；而主权违约引发银行危机，政府只有在银行恢复并有效配置投资后才重新进入市场，因此排斥是内生的。
Abstract Why do governments borrow internationally? Why do they temporarily remain out of international financial markets after default? This paper develops a quantitative model of sovereign default to propose a unified answer to these questions. In the model, the government has an incentive to borrow internationally since the domestic return on capital exceeds the world interest rate, due to a friction in the banking sector. Since banks are exposed to sovereign debt, sovereign default causes a financial crisis. After default, the government chooses to reaccess international capital markets only once banks have recovered and efficiently allocate investment again. Exclusion hence arises endogenously.