Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one‐part and two‐part pricing
本文在离散连续选择模型中比较统一定价与两部定价，发现带单价承诺的两部定价是企业最优策略，而不带承诺的两部定价福利最差，统一定价在某些条件下消费者和社会福利最高但利润最低。
Abstract. This paper compares one‐part and two‐part pricing in a discrete‐continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two‐part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without ‘unit‐price commitment,’ where the lack of unit‐price commitment is consistent with ‘after‐market monopolization.’ We find that two‐part pricing with unit‐price commitment is firms’ dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two‐part pricing without unit‐price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one‐part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.