From One Sympathy to Another
分析了格鲁希对亚当·斯密《道德情操论》的翻译及其评论，指出其同情体系的自利基础导致她忽略了斯密关于自爱与自私的重要区分，并探讨了她放弃斯密运动词汇与缺乏认同过程之间的联系。
This essay examines Grouchy’s translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments along with her critical commentary on Smith’s moral philosophy: The Letters on Sympathy. In this paper, we analyze these two pieces as a whole and build on Grouchy’s commentary in order to highlight some of her choices of translation. Thus we supplement the existing interpretations of Grouchy’s choices of translation. We show that the self-interested basis of her system of sympathy might explain, at least in part, why she missed the important Smithian distinction between self-love and selfishness. Likewise, we make a connection between her abandonment of Smith’s vocabulary of movements and the absence of an identification process in her own analysis of sympathy.