Electoral Systems and Public Spending
研究选举制度如何影响OECD和拉美国家的公共支出规模与结构，区分了易于地理瞄准的货物服务采购和易于社会群体瞄准的转移支付，理论模型预测比例代表制下选民倾向选举偏好转移支付的议员，而多数制下偏好公共品，实证支持了这些预测。
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policy-making under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.