An Analysis of Stock Recommendations
研究投资者对分析师动机不确定时股票报告的信息含量，发现动机不透明会阻碍信息完全披露，评级系统内生形成，且改善透明度可能反而降低信息含量。
We study the information content of stock reports when investors are uncertain about a Þnancial analyst’s incentives. Incentives may be aligned, in which case the analyst wishes to credibly convey his information, or incentives may be misaligned. We Þnd that: (a) Any investor uncertainty about incentives makes full revelation of information impossible. (b) Categorical ranking systems, such as those commonly used by brokerages, arise endogenously as equilibria. (c) Under certain conditions, analysts with aligned incentives can credibly convey unfavorable information, but can never credibly convey favorable information. (d) Policies that improve transparency of analyst incentives might reduce the information content of stock reports. Finally, we examine testable implications of the model compared to empirical analyses of stock recommendations. JEL #s: G24, D82