Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining
通过实验研究最后通牒博弈中社会比较的影响，告知回应者平均出价会显著提高出价和被拒概率，结果支持人们对公平规范的厌恶，而非对收入差距的厌恶。
Abstract Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30— ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.