Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms
利用意大利三十多年近百万人的数据，研究发现政客通过企业为其家族成员提供私企职位，这本质上是政企间的权钱交易，但比直接受贿更难被察觉。
This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals’ labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians.