Pay me Right: Reference Values and Executive Compensation
利用薪酬指引准实验，发现CEO薪酬会逐渐向新的参照值调整，调整速度受公司治理特征影响，为考虑参照值的谈判模型提供实证支持。
Abstract This paper examines the importance of reference values for executive compensation contracts. We rely on a quasi‐experimental setting (the adoption of pay guidelines), and a well‐defined measure of individual‐specific reference values to provide evidence on how a change in CEO reference compensation leads to subsequent changes of actual pay. We find that executive compensation adjusts gradually towards the new reference values, and that the speed of the adjustment depends on the corporate governance characteristics: the firm ownership structure, the role of the State and of the employees in the firm decision making. These results provide empirical support for theoretical models of bargaining that take into account reference values .