DIFFERENTIAL RISK‐TAKING IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES FROM STOCK AND STOCK OPTION HOLDINGS
研究了1992至2017年美国高管薪酬中股票和股票期权产生的绩效激励对风险承担的不同影响，发现股票持有带来的激励更倾向于降低风险，而期权激励则相反，并提出了新的衡量指标。
Abstract We study the risk‐taking implications of managerial pay‐for‐performance incentives (delta) arising from stock and stock options separately in the United States between 1992 and 2017. The current literature assumes that each unit of delta has an equal incentive effect on firm performance. Instead, we show that the risk‐reducing effect of performance incentives is more pronounced for executives whose delta comes mostly from stock holdings relative to option holdings. Accordingly, we propose a new measure that takes into account the magnitude of delta from option holdings relative to delta from stock holdings (source ratio). Our results show that risk taking increases as this ratio increases.