Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets
研究了软预算约束下医院提供质量和成本效率的激励，发现更高的救助概率降低成本效率，而利润没收则同时降低质量和效率；最优价格下严格的不救助和不没收政策可实现最优，但次优价格下更宽松的救助政策可能改善福利。
We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First‐best is achieved by a strict no‐bailout and no‐profit‐confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare‐improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high‐cost patients.