The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections
研究显示，在年轻民主国家中，中央政府通过与地方政府结盟来影响全国选举，例如通过选举舞弊。基于罗马尼亚地方选举和2012年总统弹劾公投的断点回归分析发现，与政府联盟结盟的地方选区公投投票率更高，且选票分布异常，暗示存在选票填充行为。
Abstract How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the government coalition—the impeachment initiators. Electoral forensics tests present abnormal vote count distributions across polling stations, consistent with ballot stuffing. The alignment effect, driven by rural localities, may explain the clientelistic government transfers found in this context and documented worldwide.